We analyze the e¤ects of antitrust and leniency programs in a repeated oligopoly model outlined in Motta and Polo (2003). We extend their framework by including the possibility of Type I judicial errors and pre-trial settlements. Through comparison of our results to the earlier results we come to a number of novel conclusions. Firstly, antitrust enforcement in the presence of judicial errors is less e¤ective and ex-ante deterrence is weaker than was predicted by Motta and Polo (2003). Secondly, adverse e¤ects of leniency programs are underestimated by the traditional approach, which does not take Type I judicial errors into account.
Introduction
Antitrust policies in the US and the EC currently include leniency programs as one of the key ingredients. Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from …nes to cartel members collaborating with the antitrust authority (AA) by revealing information about the cartel.
This revelation may take place ex-ante before any investigation by the AA starts, or ex-post during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based upon the economic principle that …rms, who broke the law, might report their illegal activities if given proper incentives.
E¤ective leniency programs might dissolve existing cartels or, even better, a priori deter such illegal activities.
The US Department of Justice (1998) and Miller (2009) report some empirical evidence in favor of the major modi…cations of its leniency program in 1993. Despite this evidence, Spagnolo (2007) asserts that the e¤ects of leniency programs are still not fully understood theoretically. Our study belongs to a growing literature on the e¤ects of leniency programs in antitrust. Optimal implementation of antitrust policy and leniency programs for cartel enforcement have been analyzed in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003) , Rey (2003) , Spagnolo (2008) , Harrington (2008) , Hinloopen (2003 Hinloopen ( , 2006 , Motchenkova (2004) , Buccorossi and Spagnolo (2006) , Chen and Rey (2007) , and Chen and Harrington (2007) .
The above mentioned papers o¤er interesting insights on the e¤ects of leniency programs on the behavior of colluding …rms, but they do not consider judicial errors, which is the main ingredient of our paper. Judicial errors and their reduction, i.e. accuracy, are a central concern in law enforcement. They have been analyzed by Kaplow (1994) , Kaplow and Shavell (1994, 1996) , Polinsky and Shavell (2000) , Png (1986) , and Tullock (1994) among others. They focus on the negative impact of such errors on marginal deterrence. In this framework accuracy is always desirable, and it is chosen optimally balancing the marginal bene…ts and costs.
Another stream of literature closely related to this issue is the literature on pre-trial settlements and plea bargaining. There an individual is given the option to plead guilty in exchange for a less harsh penalty rather than waiting for a court decision.
1 Landes (1971) indicates that empirical evidence shows that most cases are disposed of before trial by either a guilty plea or a dismissal of the charges. He shows that the decision to settle or to go to trial depends on the probability of conviction by trial, the severity of the crime, the availability and productivity of the prosecutor's and defendant's resources, trial versus settlement cost and attitudes towards risk. The main result of Landes (1971) is that plea bargaining reduces prosecution cost. Landes neglects the implications of the possible existence of innocent de-1 Plea bargaining seems to be comparable to ex-post (after the start of an investigation) leniency application. One di¤erence is that in leniency programs …rms can also apply for leniency ex-ante, before an investigation has started. Another di¤erence is that the …rm only needs to plea guilty and does not need to provide information about the crime supposedly committed, while in case of applying for leniency in a leniency program …rms are obliged to provide evidence.
fendants. Grossman and Katz (1983) do take into account the possibility of having innocent defendants and they use an objective function which incorporates the social disutility of punishing the innocent. They …nd that plea bargains can act as an insurance device by insuring society against possible erroneous outcomes in a courtroom. We also …nd a similar result in our paper. The other role it can play is a screening device. This is also implied in Kobayashi and Lott (1996) . The above mentioned papers examine a single-defendant setting, but there are also studies on multi-defendant settlements, in which multiple defendants are charged with the same crime and in which they can choose between settling or not. These models …t antitrust cases very well. Examples are Kobayashi (1992) , Easaterbrook et al. (1980), and Polinsky and Shavell (1981) .
A more speci…c literature on competition policy enforcement has considered the e¤ects of an inappropriate intervention by an AA. In the model of collusion Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) …nd that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement errors. Type II errors reduce expected …nes, while Type I errors encourage industries to collude when faced with the risk of false conviction. This leads to the conclusion that antitrust policy, with non-negligible enforcement errors, can sti ‡e genuine competition. One of the outcomes of our model also con…rms this result. In Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009) a welfare analysis of legal standard is developed, comparing per-se rules and discriminating (e¤ect based) rules characterized by a lower probability of errors. The authors identify some key elements that can help to choose the more appropriate legal standard and the cases in which Type I and Type II accuracy is more desirable.
In the literature on enforcement errors and plea bargaining the enforcer balances the goal of condemning the guilty agents and not condemning the innocent ones with the minimization of resources devoted to enforcement. The problem of possibly condemning the innocent ones (a Type I error) plays a vital role in this literature. In competition policy as a whole and leniency programs speci…cally, the problem of Type I error needs to be taken into account as well. We extend the above mentioned literature by looking at how the impact of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement would change if Type I judicial errors and the possibility of pre-trial settlements and plea bargaining would be present. For this purpose we adopt the repeated games framework outlined in Motta and Polo (2003) and extend it by relaxing a number of assumptions. Motta and Polo (2003) were the …rst to construct a dynamic analytical framework for analysis of the e¤ects of reduced …nes for …rms cooperating with the antitrust authorities. They show that, by reducing the expected …nes, leniency programs may induce a pro-collusive reaction. So if the recourses available to the AA are su¢ cient, leniency programs should not be used. However, when the AA has limited resources, leniency programs may be optimal in a second best perspective. Fine reductions when an investigation is opened increase the probability of ex-post desistance and save resources of the AA, thereby raising welfare. They also found that the optimal scheme is to give …rms that collaborate, a full …ne reduction and that a regime where …rms are entitled to …ne discounts even if they reveal information after an inquiry is opened is better than a regime where …rms can only get a …ne reduction if they reveal before an inquiry is opened.
Our paper extends the model by Motta and Polo (2003) by introducing the possibility of having both Type I and Type II errors and by looking at the behavior of …rms when they could be wrongly convicted. We also include the possibility of pre-trial settlements. We analyze an in…nitely repeated stage game between …rms and the AA in the presence of leniency programs. After the start of an investigation, colluding …rms can use a leniency program, reveal information, and pay a reduced …ne. Or they can choose not to reveal, which means they will go to trial and pay a full …ne if convicted and pay nothing if acquitted. Contrary to Motta and Polo (2003) we have two deviating strategies. If the AA starts an investigation deviating …rms can choose not to settle before the court and go to trial, which means they will pay nothing if acquitted and pay a full …ne if convicted (Type I error). Or they can choose to make a settlement with the prosecutor by falsely pleading guilty. If they choose to make a settlement they pay a negotiated sentence, which depends on the bargaining power of the …rm versus the bargaining power of the AA. The higher the relative bargaining power of the …rm the lower will be the expected negotiated sentence. This negotiated sentence is assumed to be lower than the full …ne but higher than the reduced …ne paid by colluding …rms that reveal information.
2 Deviating …rms can't apply for a leniency program since they can't provide evidence which proofs the existence of a cartel, so they can only choose between pleading guilty and pleading not guilty.
We …nd that for certain parameter values innocent …rms, knowing they could be convicted, choose to make a settlement with the prosecutor by falsely pleading guilty in order to avoid a possible higher …ne. Hence, innocent …rms may use pre-trial settlements as an insurance device against possible Type I errors. Another …nding is that, when the possibility of Type I errors and pre-trial settlements is not taken into account the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs may be underestimated. What is also found is that, compared to Motta and Polo (2003) model, collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parameter values. This means that the existence of Type I errors and the possibility to plead guilty may make competition policy less e¤ective. This could be due to the fact that …rms choose to use collusion as a precautionary measure against a possible Type I error. This point is also indicated by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) .
The next section provides the model description. Section 3 looks at …rms' decisions. 
The Model
We analyze a group of perfectly symmetric …rms. These …rms choose between collusion or competitive behavior, taking into account the enforcement activity of the antitrust authority (AA). In the equilibrium analysis symmetric …rms are considered: hence, all …rms will choose the same (collusive or deviating) strategy. The AA and courts are benevolent, but they may commit errors. Following the literature, we can distinguish two types of errors: the enforcer can erroneously …ne the …rm when it behaves competitively (Type I error) or mistakenly acquit the colluding …rm (Type II error). The AA chooses a certain enforcement policy, which might entail the use of leniency programs. The content of the collusive agreement prescribes both the market conduct and the behavior towards the AA. A cartel, for example, may prescribe to its members to replicate the monopoly con…guration and to refuse any cooperation with the AA during the inquiries, or conversely, it may allow the members to reveal information if the AA opens a review of the industry. Any …rm, if monitored, can choose between either settling before the court or going into trial. If pre-trial settlement occurs, the …rm pays a negotiated sentence. Now, …rst, the policy choices of the AA are described, moving then to the …rms'strategies.
Enforcement choices
At t = 0 the AA sets the following four policy parameters.
The full …nes F 2 [0; F ] for …rms that are convicted and have not cooperated with the AA or did not settle before the court, where F is exogenously given by the law.
The reduced …nes R 2 [0; F ] speci…ed by a leniency program together with the eligibility conditions. All the …rms that cooperate, even after an investigation is opened, can be granted reduced …nes R.
The probability 2 [0; 1] that the …rms are reviewed by the AA. This review stage is the …rst stage of an investigation.
The probability p 2 [0; 1] that the AA successfully concludes the investigation when …rms do not cooperate or do not settle before the court.
When the AA is running an investigation it is able to collect and use evidence up to the current period. Once the investigation is opened, the AA has to conclude it with a decision.
Extending the Motta and Polo (2003) framework we assume here that the AA can make both Type I and Type II judicial errors: if an industry where …rms are not colluding is reviewed, the investigation still enters the prosecution stage. A review on colluding …rms can be ended in two ways: either some cartel member reveals information to the AA, in which case the participants are found guilty with probability one (and there is no need to enter the prosecution stage), or nobody reveals information. In this case the AA has to go on with the investigation, trying to prove the …rms guilty, which occurs with probability p (Type II errors might occur) and takes more time. 4 A review of non-colluding …rms can be ended in two ways as well: either the …rm settles before trial (for example, by making use of plea bargaining) with negotiated sentence, N 2 (R; F ), smaller than full …ne F (and there is no need to enter the prosecution stage), or before court settlement does not succeed. In this case the AA has to go on with the investigation. Then with probability p type I error occurs and the innocent …rm has to pay the full …ne, and with probability (1 p) the true state of the world (no collusion) is discovered.
5
The policy parameters are exogenous and once these are set the …rms choose their strategies.
Firms'strategies
After the AA sets the policy parameters at t = 0, …rms select a collusive strategy or a deviating strategy at t = 1. They can choose between one of the following two collusive or one of the following two deviating strategies.
-
In the …rst collusive strategy, CR (Collude and Reveal), …rms collude from t = 1 on, as long as no deviation occurs. If in period t no inquiry is opened, they realize collusive pro…ts M at the end of the period. If in period t the AA opens a review, …rms reveal information, pay the reduced …ne R and are forced to non-cooperative pricing for the current period, with competitive pro…ts N < M . In t + 1, since no deviation from the equilibrium strategy occurred, they go back to the collusive strategy.
In the second collusive strategy, CNR (Collude and Not Reveal), …rms collude from t = 1 on, as long as no deviation occurs. If in period t no inquiry is opened, they realize collusive pro…ts M at the end of the period. If in period t a review is opened, they do not reveal any information to the AA (which needs therefore another period to conclude the investigation) and obtain collusive pro…ts M . At t + 1, if they are proved guilty, they pay the …ne F and set competitive prices, with competitive pro…ts N ; at t + 2 they return back to the collusive behavior. 6 If at t + 1 they are not proved guilty, they obtain collusive pro…ts 4 When the antitrust authority proves …rms guilty, it is able to impose compliance in the current period, for instance by imposing restrictions and remedies on …rms'behavior, e.g. competitive pricing. This temporary desistance e¤ect of an adverse decision wants to capture the common fact that a guilty …rm is often required to produce reports to the antitrust authority for a certain period on its market strategies and is subject to a light monitoring regime in that phase. 5 The size of the negotiated sentence N 2 (R; F ) depends on the bargaining power of the AA versus the bargaining power of the …rm. Hence, the negotiated sentence N is not a policy parameter set by the AA. The negotiated sentence N is assumed to be higher than the reduced …ne R, since in order to be granted a reduced …ne R …rms need to provide information which proves the existence of a cartel. This means leniency programs, in which …rms pay the reduced …ne dominate settlements, in which …rms pay the negotiated sentence. Hence, colluding …rms would prefer …ling a leniency application over plea bargaining. Deviating …rms can't apply for leniency since they don't have information which proves the existence of a cartel.
6 Similar assumption was adopted in Motta and Polo (2003).
M and will go on colluding. -In the …rst deviating strategy, which is called DPG (Deviate and Plead Guilty), a …rm deviates from a collusive agreement at t = 1 and in period t the …rm realizes a deviating
at the end of the period. If in period t the AA opens a review, the …rm will plead guilty and pay the negotiated sentence N . From t + 1 on, since deviation occurred there will be Nash punishment forever with competitive pro…ts N and if an inquiry is opened the …rm will plead guilty, settle, and pay the negotiated sentence N .
In the second deviating strategy, which is called DPNG (Deviate and Plead Not guilty), a …rm deviates from a collusive agreement in t = 1 and realizes deviating pro…t D in period t and competitive pro…ts N in all subsequent periods because of Nash punishment by the other …rms. If in period t an investigation is opened, the …rm pleads not guilty (pre-trial settlement does not occur), which means the AA needs another period to conclude the investigation. In t + 1, if the …rm is proved guilty, it pays the …ne F and it will receive competitive pro…t N . Starting at t + 2 this two stage game is repeated again, with the di¤erence that the …rst stage pro…t is given by competitive pro…t N and not deviating pro…t D .
The …rms'decisions
Before we discuss the set-up outlined above we would like to relate our analysis to Motta and Polo (2003) . For comparison, their paper provides analysis of the two collusive strategies:
CR and CNR and one Deviating (D) strategy. This leads to three possible equilibrium outcomes, which are: the Collude and Reveal (CR) equilibrium, in which …rms choose to collude and reveal if monitored, the Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) equilibrium, in which …rms choose to collude and not reveal if monitored and the No Collusion (NC) equilibrium, in which …rms choose deviation from a collusive agreement. In our model, which includes judicial errors (both Type I and Type II) and pre-trial settlement, the simple Deviating strategy is replaced by the two other possibilities. Hence, the set of possible deviating equilibria will expand to the Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) and the Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) equilibria, in which a …rm deviates and, if monitored, respectively pleads guilty or not guilty.
Collusive strategies 3.1.1 CR: Collude and Reveal
When the collude and reveal strategy is chosen, …rms collude in the market and reveal information to the AA if a review is opened. The …rms are reviewed with probability and, if monitored, they reveal and are forced to compete in the current period and pay the reduced …ne R; then, the game restarts. Following Motta and Polo (2003) the value of the collude and reveal strategy (V CR ) is given by
Where M are the pro…ts from collusion, N < M the non-cooperative pro…ts obtained during the compliance phase and 2 (0, 1) is the discount factor. The …rst term corresponds to the value of collusion in the standard case where no antitrust intervention is considered.
The value of collusion becomes smaller if there is antitrust investigation, which happens with probability , due to two reasons: the …rms pay the reduced …ne R when found guilty, and they have a pro…t loss M N when the AA forces them to interrupt the collusive behavior for the current period.
Next, we recall the condition, which is required for the existence of a CR equilibrium in Motta and Polo (2003) under assumption that the AA does not make Type I errors. For that Motta and Polo (2003) compare the value of the CR strategy (V CR ) with the value of the simple Deviating strategy (V D ):
If this inequality holds, the CR strategy is preferred over the simple Deviating strategy.
CNR: Collude and not reveal
When the CNR strategy is chosen …rms do not reveal if they are monitored, which happens with probability . This means they continue colluding in the current period, while in the next period they are condemned with probability p; in this case, they pay the full …ne F and behave non-cooperatively for the current period, while if not proved guilty collusion continues; after two periods the game restarts. If …rms are not monitored in a CNR equilibrium, some other industry will be reviewed and the AA will not open new reviews for two periods, having to conclude the cases opened; hence, …rms will have two periods of safe collusive pro…ts before the game restarts. The value of the game under a CNR strategy is therefore
After rearranging the following value function is obtained:
The standard cartel pro…ts are reduced by the expected losses from antitrust enforcement, where now the ex-ante probability of being …ned is p.
Next, we …nd the condition, which is needed for the existence of a CNR equilibrium. Similarly to Motta and Polo (2003) , we compare the value of the CNR strategy (V CN R ) with the value of the simple Deviating strategy (V D ). The inequality
Next, we determine when one of the collusive strategies dominates the other. For this purpose the value functions of the two collusive strategies (V CN R and V CR ) need to be compared. The inequality V CN R > V CR leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 A Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Reveal (CR) strategy, if the following inequality holds:
This condition states that if probability of conviction is high enough …rms will have higher incentives to self-report. Not surprisingly, the incentives to self-report are smaller when the reduced …ne (R) increases. Similarly to Motta and Polo (2003) , this threshold divides the region with collusive equilibria into two regions (the CNR and the CR equilibria).
3.2 Non-collusive strategies
DPG: Deviate and Plead Guilty
If a …rm chooses the strategy DPG, it will deviate from a collusive agreement and receive a onetime deviating pro…t D . If an investigation starts, which happens with probability , the …rm will plead guilty, settle before the court, and pay the negotiated sentence, N .
In all subsequent periods, there will be Nash punishment and the …rm receives competitive pro…ts, N . Under this strategy, in the subgame after deviation, if an investigation starts, the …rm will always plead guilty and pay the negotiated sentence N . So the value of the DPG strategy (V DP G ) is
Where the value of a plead guilty (PG) strategy (V P G ) in the subgame after deviation is given by the following formula:
Substituting V P G into V DP G and rearranging V DP G we obtain the following value function:
Here, the expression is composed of the one-time value of deviating in the current period, the discounted future competitive pro…ts less the discounted costs of paying the negotiated sentence whenever the investigation is open. In order to determine when a DPG strategy is preferred over the collusive strategies, the DPG value function (V DP G ) needs to be compared with the collusive value functions (V CR and V CN R ).
Lemma 2 A Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Reveal (CR) and a Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy, respectively, if the following inequalities hold:
Proof. The conditions follow from the inequalities V DP G > V CR and V DP G > V CN R , respectively.
These conditions imply that incentives to deviate and plea guilty increase when either the negotiated sentence decreases or …nes (both full and reduced) increase. Next, the conditions needed for a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty strategy to be preferred over the collusive strategies will be analyzed.
DPNG: Deviate and Plead Not Guilty
If a …rm chooses the strategy DPNG it will receive a onetime deviating pro…t D and all subsequent periods there will be Nash punishment with competitive pro…ts N . If an investigation starts, which happens with probability , the …rm chooses to plead not guilty, and the AA needs another period to conclude the investigation. In this period the …rm receives competitive pro…ts N and can be convicted with probability p (due to Type I error), in which case it has to pay the …ne F . After two periods the game restarts. The value of the game if a …rm chooses the strategy DPNG will be as follows
Where the value of a plead not guilty (PNG) strategy (V P N G ) in the subgame after deviation is given by the following formula
After substituting V P N G into V DP N G and rearranging the following function is obtained
Here, the expression is composed of the one-time value of deviating in the current period, the discounted future competitive pro…ts less the discounted costs of paying the expected …ne. In order to determine when a DPNG strategy is preferred over the collusive strategies, the DPNG value function (V DP N G ) needs to be compared with the collusive value functions (V CR and V CN R ).
Lemma 3 A Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) and a Collude and Reveal (CR) strategy, respectively, if the following inequalities hold:
Proof. The conditions follow from the inequalities, V DP N G > V CN R and V DP N G > V CR ; respectively.
Condition (10) implies that the choice between DPNG and CNR strategies does not depend on the …ning system or the structure of the leniency program. While (11) implies that incentives to deviate and plea not guilty increase when either the reduced …ne increases or the expected full …ne decreases. Next, the condition needed for one deviating strategy to be preferred over the other will be analyzed.
DPG vs. DPNG
In the subgame after the deviation …rms either settle or they plead not guilty and investigation continues. In order to determine when one deviating strategy dominates the other, we compare the value functions of the two deviating strategies (V DP N G and V DP G ).
Lemma 4
In any subgame after deviation a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy dominates a Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy if the following inequality holds
Proof. The condition follows from the inequality V DP N G > V DP G . From expression (12) it is clear that a reduction in the expected negotiated sentence will result in higher incentive to plea guilty and lower incentive to plea not guilty. The inequality (12) shows that threshold p DP N G (N ) decreases if the negotiated sentence decreases. This means the inequality becomes stricter and there are less incentives to plea not guilty and more incentives to plea guilty. The analysis of Subgame Perfect Equilibria outcomes in this model depends on the size of the negotiated sentence N . In the next section we look at the distribution of equilibrium outcomes for three di¤erent levels of the size of the negotiated sentence.
Determination of Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In the following lemma we derive the condition on N such that Figure 1 holds, i.e. the three thresholds derived above in (7), (10), and (12) intersect in the same point. This level of the negotiated sentence is denoted by N and corresponds to the case of intermediate bargaining power for the …rm. It also appears that for N = N the p CN R threshold derived in Motta and Polo (2003) , recall expression (5), exactly coincides with the p DP N G threshold in (12).
Lemma 5 Plotting thresholds a DP G=CR , a DP N G=CN R (p); and p DP N G in the (p; ) diagram implies that, when N = N =
2 (R; F ); all three thresholds intersect in the same point (p ; ) with p = p DP N G and = a DP G=CR .
Proof. Recall expressions for p DP N G and a DP N G=CN R (p) in (12) and (10), respectively. Substituting p DP N G into a DP N G=CN R (p) gives a DP N G=CN R (p DP N G ) =
.
Next, setting a DP G=CR (N ) in (7) equal to a DP N G=CN R (p DP N G ) gives:
: Solving this for N gives: N =
is precisely equal to p CN R speci…ed in (5).
As mentioned above the negotiated sentence N should always be larger than the reduced …ne R; otherwise settling is more attractive for colluding …rms than application for leniency. Clearly The thresholds a DP N G=CN R (p), a DP G=CR , p DP N G and p CN R divide the space in the ( , p) diagram into four regions DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR. These areas indicate for which parameter values it is optimal to choose one of the four strategies. A high probability of being monitored ( ) and a high probability of being convicted (p) lead to a Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy, while a high probability of being monitored ( ) but a bit lower probability of being convicted (p) lead to a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy. The strategy Collude and Reveal (CR) is chosen when the probability of being monitored ( ) is low but the probability of conviction (p) is high. The strategy Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) is chosen when the probability of being monitored ( ) is low and the probability of conviction (p) is low.
If the bargaining power of the …rm is relatively higher, the expected negotiated sentence N will be lower than N . If N < N , thresholds p DP N G and a DP G=CR given by (12) and (7) shift compared to the N = N case and the three thresholds (7), (10), and (12) will not intersect in the same point anymore. In this case the a DP G=CN R (p) threshold will be needed to indicate when a Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy. This situation is described in the following lemma and illustrated in Figure 2 .
Lemma 6 When N < N ; plotting relevant thresholds in the (p; ) diagram implies that the thresholds a DP N G=CN R (p) and a DP G=CN R (p) intersect at p DP N G and the thresholds a DP G=CR and a DP G=CN R (p) intersect at p CN R . This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Proof. Setting a DP N G=CN R (p) = a DP G=CN R (p) gives: When N < N , due to a stronger bargaining position and a lower expected negotiated sentence, the DPG area increases. This implies that the Deviate and Plea Guilty strategy has become more attractive and it is sustainable for a bigger range of parameter values.
Moreover, the leftward shift of the p DP N G threshold and the downward shift of the a DP G=CR threshold imply that the DPNG, CR and CNR strategies have become less attractive, since they are sustainable for a smaller range of parameter values compared to Figure 1 .
If the …rm has a relatively lower bargaining power, the expected negotiated sentence N will be higher than N . In this case thresholds p DP N G and a DP G=CR given by (12) and (7) also shift compared to the N = N case and the three thresholds in (7), (10), and (12) do not intersect in the same point anymore. In this case the a DP N G=CR (p) threshold will be needed to indicate when a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Reveal (CR) strategy. This situation is described in the following lemma and illustrated in Figure 3 .
Lemma 7 When N > N ; plotting relevant thresholds in the (p; ) diagram implies that the thresholds a DP N G=CN R (p) and a DP N G=CR (p) intersect at p CN R and the thresholds a DP G=CR and a DP N G=CR (p) intersect at p DP N G .
Proof. Setting a DP N G=CN R (p) = a DP N G=CR (p) gives:
: Setting a DP G=CR = a DP N G=CR (p) gives: 
Results
Based on the above mentioned thresholds, for three di¤erent levels of the negotiated sentence, we can determine for which parameter values the four di¤erent Subgame Perfect Equilibria (DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR) are sustainable.
Proposition 8 In the repeated game played by the …rms from t = 1 on, once the policy parameters (F , R, , p) are set, we can describe the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) in the ( , p) space for three levels of the negotiated sentence (N ) as follows: -When N = N , DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for 2 ( DP G=CR (N ); 1] and p 2 (p DP N G (N ); 1], DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE when is above the locus DP N G=CN R (p) and p is below the locus p DP N G (N ), CR is the Pareto dominant SPE for 2 [0; DP G=CR (N )) and p 2 (p CN R ; 1]; while the unique SPE is CNR otherwise.
-When N < N , DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for > maxf DP G=CR (N ); DP G=CN R (p)g and p > p DP N G (N ), DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE when is above the locus DP N G=CN R (p) and p is below the locus p DP N G (N ), CR is the Pareto dominant SPE for, 2 [0; DP G=CR (N )) and p 2 (p CN R ; 1]; while the unique SPE is CNR otherwise.
-When N > N , DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for, 2 ( DP G=CR (N ); 1] and p 2 (p DP N G (N ); 1], DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE for, > maxf DP N G=CR (p); DP N G=CN R (p)g and p is below the locus p DP N G (N ), CNR is the Pareto dominant SPE when is below the locus DP N G=CN R (p) and p < p CN R , while the unique SPE is CR otherwise.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 1-7 and illustrated by …gures 1, 2, and 3. Proposition 8 identi…es the regions where the DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR equilibria exist, for three di¤erent levels of the negotiated sentence (or bargaining power of the …rm).
In case of intermediate bargaining power (N = N ) a high probability of investigation ( ) and a high probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a DPG equilibrium and a high probability of investigation ( ) but a somewhat lower probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a DPNG equilibrium. This is to be expected since a high probability of investigation, > maxf DP N G=CN R (p); DP G=CR (N )g, leads to …rms choosing a deviating strategy. If the probability of being convicted is high as well (p > p DP N G (N )) a deviating …rm will choose to plead guilty in order to avoid having to pay a high …ne in case of a Type I error. However, if the probability of being convicted is somewhat lower the expected loss in case of a Type I error will also be lower and a deviating …rm will choose not to plead guilty.
A low probability of investigation ( ) and a low probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a CNR equilibrium and a low probability of investigation ( ) but a high probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a CR equilibrium. This follows from the fact that a low probability of investigation, < maxf DP N G=CN R (p); DP G=CR (N )g, leads to a collusive strategy by …rms. If the probability of being convicted (p) is low as well, p < p CN R (R), …rms may expect a Type II error and choose not to reveal in the subgame after collusion. If the probability of being convicted is high, p > p CN R (R), …rms will choose to reveal in the subgame after collusion, meaning they apply for a leniency program in order to avoid being punished.
If the …rm has low bargaining power (N > N ), the curves DP G=CR (N ) and p DP N G (N ) Proposition 9 For given N , the DPG equilibrium exists when > DP G=CR (N ) and p > p DP N G (N ):When the size of the negotiated sentence (N) decreases, the DPG equilibrium becomes sustainable for a wider range of parameter values.
Proof. First, consider the situation described in Figure 1 , where N = N . Clearly, the set of parameters, for which the DPG strategy can be sustained as a SPE, is non-empty.
Next, recall expressions (7) and (12) This proposition implies that deviating …rms may choose to plead guilty in order to avoid being wrongly convicted, and the higher the relative bargaining power, i.e. the lower the expected negotiated sentence, the more incentive they have to do so. So plea bargaining may be used as an insurance device against possible Type I errors. This con…rms the result obtained in di¤erent setting in Grossman and Katz (1993) .
Comparison to Motta and Polo (2003)
The following …gure compares the situation without Type I errors and pre-trial settlements, as in Motta and Polo (2003) , with the case in which Type I errors and pre-trial settlements are included, as discussed in our model. The …gure is constructed for the parameter values:
and R = 0, but, obviously, results of this comparison also hold in general setting whenever N = N . In the …rst case, without Type I errors and pre-trial settlements, the regions with collusive equilibria are marked CNR (1) and CR (1) and the rest is the no collusion (NC) region. After including Type I errors and pre-trial settlements the regions with collusive equilibria expand to CNR (2) and CR (2) and the region with the deviating equilibria shrinks and is divided into DPG and DPNG regions. The following proposition can be derived from Figure 4 .
Conclusion 10
The range of parameter values for which collusion can be sustainable expands after including Type I errors and pre-trial settlements.
Proof. This result follows directly from the fact that the locus DP N G=CN R (p) in (10) is always above the locus CN R (p) given by (4). Consider
. For any p 2 (0; 1); the numerators of these two expressions are the same, while the denominator of DP N G=CN R is always smaller than the denominator of CN R , due to F > 0. Next, it is straightforward to show that the locus DP G=CR in (7) is always above the locus CR given by (2). This proposition implies that …rms are more inclined to choose collusion, when they know there is a possibility that they will be wrongly convicted and they have the option to plead guilty. This means that the existence of Type I errors and the option to settle before trial, may make antitrust enforcement less e¤ective. This could be because …rms use collusion as a precautionary measure against a possible Type I error. Similar result was obtained in a di¤erent framework by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) . Figure 4 also shows that after including Type I errors and possibility of pre-trial settlements, region 1a changes to region 1b and region 2a changes to region 2b, with region 2a being part of region 2b. As de…ned in Motta and Polo (2003) , region 1 re ‡ects the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs and region 2 re ‡ects the positive e¤ects of leniency programs.
Region 1 is a region of parameters, which induces collude and reveal strategy under leniency programs, while without reduced …nes collusion would be prevented. Region 2 is a region of parameters for which the use of leniency programs allows to obtain ex-post desistance, by inducing revelation and shortening the investigation. Figure 4 shows that both regions expand compared to results in Motta and Polo (2003) . This leads to the following result.
Conclusion 11
Exclusion of the possibility of Type I errors and pre-trial settlements implies underestimation of the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
Proof. The proof can be visualized by looking at the areas of regions 1a and 1b in Figure 4 . Area 1b exceeds the area of region 1a. First we show that the slope of
is always bigger (for the same values of p) than the slope of CN R (p) =
. Di¤erentiating the above speci…ed thresholds w.r.t. p we obtain
p 2 . This implies that the area of region 1b exceeds the area of region 1a in Figure 4 .
This result implies that the traditional approach of looking at the e¤ects of leniency programs, which does not take into account the possibility of Type I errors and pre-trial settlements, may underestimate the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
To summarize, incorporation of the important features of real practice like judicial errors and pre-trial settlements in the in…nitely repeated game framework suggested in Motta and Polo (2003) gives the following results. Firstly, we …nd that for certain parameter values innocent …rms, knowing they could be convicted, choose to make a settlement with the prosecutor by falsely pleading guilty in order to avoid a possible higher …ne. This means innocent …rms may use pre-trial settlements as an insurance device against possible Type I errors. Secondly, we conclude that antitrust enforcement in general is less e¤ective than was predicted by Motta and Polo (2003) . When including the possibility of Type I error and plea bargaining, collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parameter values. This would also imply that the ex-ante deterrence is weaker than was estimated in Motta and Polo (2003) . Finally, as implied by Conclusion 11, adverse e¤ects of leniency programs are also stronger than was predicted.
Conclusion
A lack of information makes competition policy enforcement very di¢ cult and can lead to imperfect competition law enforcement (i.e. Type I errors -convicting innocent …rms, or Type II errors -acquitting …rms that are in fact guilty). This study is an extension of Motta and Polo (2003) model and looks at leniency programs, pre-trial settlements and enforcement errors. Motta and Polo (2003) constructed a dynamic analytical framework to …nd out what the e¤ects of leniency programs are. They make the simplifying assumption that if an industry where …rms are not colluding is reviewed the investigation does not enter the prosecution stage. Hence, innocent …rms will never be prosecuted and therefore will never be convicted. We extend their model by relaxing this assumption and capturing a number of real practice features.
In particular, we include the possibility of prosecuting and convicting innocent …rms and the possibility to plead guilty. After the AA starts an investigation into the behavior of …rms that deviated from collusion, these …rms choose between pleading guilty and pleading not guilty. If a …rm pleads not guilty it will be prosecuted and it pays a full …ne if convicted and it pays nothing if acquitted. If the …rm pleads guilty it will pay a negotiated sentence which is lower than the full …ne. As in Motta and Polo (2003) colluding …rms can choose between revealing and not revealing. Revealing means they apply for a leniency program and pay a reduced …ne. If they do not reveal they will be prosecuted and pay a full …ne if convicted and pay nothing if acquitted.
When the model of Motta and Polo (2003) is compared with our extended model, it is found that collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parameter values.
This means that the existence of Type I errors and the possibility of pre-trial settlements may make antitrust enforcement less e¤ective. It is also shown that for certain parameter values a Deviate and Plea Guilty equilibrium is sustainable and that …rms that deviated from collusion, choose to plead guilty more often if the negotiated sentence goes down. This means that …rms may use a plea bargain as an insurance device against a possible Type I error. Another …nding is that the traditional approach of looking at the e¤ects of leniency programs may underestimate the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
Our …ndings lead to the following policy implications. The …rst best outcome for society would be that …rms deviate from collusion and plead not guilty and then get acquitted. The probability of investigation needs to be set at a maximum level in order to achieve deviation.
If the AA doesn't have the resources to investigate all industries and all …rms, alternative instruments like increasing …nes can be considered. However, the …ne and the probability of conviction need to be high enough to achieve deviation but not that high that they lead to innocent …rms pleading guilty. Maximum increase in these two policy instruments may lead to the second best outcome, in which …rms deviate and plead guilty. If collusion couldn't be prevented the best outcome will be that …rms in the subgame after collusion reveal and pay the reduced …ne. To achieve this, the reduced …ne needs to be minimized, i.e. set equal to zero, which is also advocated in Motta and Polo (2003) .
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